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On August 27, 1848, the Hungarian Council of Ministers approved, 
as is known, a proposal for revising the constitutional status of Croatia vis 
a vis Hungary. The Council agreed, furt hermore, that slum Id this "fail to 
lead to a settlement, it was willing to agree to secession, and to accept a 
purely federal tie" A
The motion was passed in the hope of preventing the long latent — and 
of late ever more overt—series of conflicts between Croatia's and Hun­
gary's political leadership from turning into open hostility.
Croatia had been ruled by the Kings of Hungary ever since 1102; 
since 1526, the Habsburgs ruled over it in their capacity of wearers of the 
Hungarian Crown. The feudal constitution of Hungary defined it as a 
rorpM-s .sepnra/M?H, with limited self-government. The <8af<or, Croatia's 
provincial assembly —which had the right to pass (rulings that
did not infringe on the laws of the realm) and vote taxes—sent two dele­
gates to the Lower House and one delegate to the Upper House of the 
Hungarian Diet, whose legislative decisions were binding on Croatia as well. 
The Ban of Croatia — who was appointed by the King, and headed Croatia's 
judiciary and limited local government —was also a member of the 
Hungarian Upper House (when neither the Palatine nor the Chief Justice 
were present, it was his right to preside over it). The prelates and aristocrats 
of Croatia, too, had the right to sit in the Upper House, while the free cities 
and chapters sent delegates to the Lower House. With some simplification, 
we might say that the Croatian delegates had toolittle power to have a sense 
of self-government, but enough to have a good chance of obstructing 
whatever the Magyar delegates might try to change or even simply to clarify 
the rather nubulous legal situation inherited from feudal times. I t was a 
complicated, and in many respects unclear constitutional tie and thus one 
bound to give rise to conflicts, conflicts which, by the H)th century, were 
further aggravated by two familiar circumstances. The first of these was 
objective: the socio-economic development that led to national awakening, 
to the unfolding of national movements in both Hungary and Croatia. The 
second of these was the "divide and conquer" policy pursued by the
Habsburgs practically constantly since the end of the 18th century, 
though with varying consistency."
This being so, it would have been vital to the avoiding of conflict for 
the two simultaneously unfolding national movements to recognize one 
another's right to national renewal through reform, as well as one another's 
right to self-determination. I t would have been necessary, moreover, for 
them to join forces against the Habsburgs. (Vienna's policy was to keep 
both dependent with a view to centralization, and, therefore, to frustrate 
all attempts at domestic reform.) We know, however, that Croation-Magyar 
relations developed quite differently; what did happen was perhaps under­
standable under the circumstances, but certainly mutually short-sighted. 
The fact that the two national movements strained one against the other 
both made reform and renewal more difficult, and directly played into the 
hands of the Habsburgs and their supporters, whose divisive policy had a 
centralized Empire as its ultimate end.
By 1848. the differences had grown so acute as to threaten overt 
conflict; the Hungarian government sought to come to an agreement, and 
indicated its willingness to guarantee Croatia's self-determination it) a 
last-minute attempt to ward off confrontation. It is the antecedents of this 
stand —unique in the history of the multi-national countries of th e tim e- 
t hat we shall be dealing with in what is to follow, tracing them from the age 
of reform to the most immediate causes. Yet, in emphasizing its uniqueness, 
we by no means mean to imply that this stand was somehow anti-nationa­
list. It, too. was a product of the age of national movements, but it was 
a stand that was prepared to see a part ial surrender of power in the national 
interest. In this, it was truly exceptional in its time. However, right at the 
outset we need to note that all the steps that Hungary's political leaders 
were wilting to take to guarantee the dc /mVo self-determination of the 
Creations of Croatia (whom the Magyar reformers considered a historic 
nation, and who had traditionally at least a truncated body politic) were 
taken in light of the consideration that Croatia's peaceful secession would 
tend to facilitate the achievement oftheMagyars' hegemony over Hungary's 
mixed population.
The diiferences that had been festering for some time erupted at the 
Diet of 1832—1836. There were a number of hotly debated issues. The 
Croatians opposed the Magyar reformers' attempts to introduce Hungarian 
instead of Latin as the country's official language, and thus the language 
of Hungary's official communication with Croatia; they declared Croatia 
unwilling to support the reformers in recognizing Protestants as equal 
before the law (as yet Protestants could neither own land nor hold public 
office), and unwilling to grant Jews the right of settlement. The Magyars, 
in turn, were unwilling to accept the disproportionately small share Croatia 
was to pay of the country's taxes. All in all, the debates ended in a stalemate; 
and Antal Szombathclyi. the delegate from Bckcs County, an outstanding 
— though not leading —reformer, had this to say at the closing session 
on April 23, 1836: "If all the use we have of being united with Croatia is
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that our taxpayers pay taxes instead of her, that our Protestant country­
men are disowned in one part of our common homeland, and that our 
development as a nation meets with Croatia's hostility, Isay: let there be an 
end to all close ties". The passionate address met with "noisy" approval.
H. Busan, the Croatian delegate, made indignant reply: he considered 
Szombathclyi's motion "incompatible with the moderation (the Diet's) 
solemnity required", and though he was not empowered to reply to "the 
proposed rupture",he had no doubt that his electors "would answer as 
befit the glory of their ancestors", and was convinced that most of the 
Magyar delegates "knew the common interest of the two countries better 
than to share the views of the delegate from Békés". Szombathelyi wanted 
to reply in his turn, but was dissuaded by "a number of delegates" from 
doing so.
All the above we know from Kossuth's /Mr/n A'eporC.-, (No. 342),
a manuscript journal passing from one reader to the next throughout the 
country, which by that time—thanks to the diligence of Kossuth's enthusias­
tic young admirers —was appearing in close to 150 hand written copies.
After noting that Szombathelyi made no retort, Kossuth concluded 
his account on the following note: "The word, however, has been said, 
and as such, will live on."3 We do not know, and probably will never know 
whether Kossuth and Szombathelyi, who became good friends, had ever 
discussed the matter before: we do know, however, that Kossuth, who was 
just beginning his political career, did not forget the latter's words. But it 
took six years — half of which Kossuth was to spend in jail —for the idea to 
find expression in political action.
On April 15, 1840, at the next Diet, Ferenc Deák the leader of the 
reforming opposition at the time, referred to Croatia's secession in the 
debate on the more equitable taxation of this part of the country as a possi­
bility that had, for the sake of both parties, to be avoided at all cost. He 
expatiated on a point of Hungarian constitutional law much quoted at the 
time, that "Croatia is not an associated state but an annexed countrv". 
The consequences of this, he insisted, must be borne by both parties. If, 
however, the Croats "think it a sacrilege to bear their part of the tax burden 
in even the same proportion as Hungary, the desire would involuntarily be 
kindled in his breast that the tie should cease to be, though this would 
hardly be to the advantage of either Croatia or Hungary". Deák —as con­
cerned about it as most of the reformers —aimed at isolating the Illyrian 
movement, considered to be under Czarist influence. He proposed instead 
that the Croats insist not on obsolete prerogatives and the dead Latin tongue, 
but rather on the realization of their national interests —which he consi­
dered to be compatible with those the Magyars-and on the use of the 
Croatian vernacular in their own local government. Under the circum­
stances, the reference to a possible split was obviously meant to indicate 
that Hungarian public opinion was running out of patience with the Croats.'
As the 1840s wore on, the fear of "panslavism" reflected in Deák's 
address became an ever stronger feature of the Hungarian reforming opposi­
tion's attitude to the Illyrian movement.s
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The tension was aggravated, among other things, by the fact that by 
the tail of 1840 Hungarian came partly to rcpiace Latin as the official 
language to be used by the Hungarian authorities in their contacts with 
the Croatian;" and also by the fact that the Illyrian movement became ever 
more overtiy active. At the beginning of 1842, for instance, Desk's home 
county of Zala sent a circular to all the other counties asking them — as was 
the custom—to support the memorandum they had sent to the King, 
request ing the removal of the commander of the predominantly Magyar 48th 
infantry regiment. They were acting on report —later confirmed —sent to 
Deák: the commander hat had the regiment's band play a favourite 
anti-Magyar ditty of the Illyrian movement right on the Zagreb main 
square/ When the Pest County assembly met it) early June of 1842 among 
others to discuss Zala County's letter of protest the atmosphere was tense 
indeed. Feelings ran high at the news of the violence surrounding the local 
elections held in Zagreb County: the pro-Hungarian Croatian lesser nobility 
had been prevented from voting so that the candidates supported by the 
Illyrian movement might get elected to the chief county offices." Under 
such circumstances, the issue of support for Zala's memorandum led to 
debate on the whole question of Croatian-Magyar relations. It was in the 
course of this debate that a motion made by Kossuth was adopted by the 
assembly in the following from:" "...Since it has not been the aim of 
legislation, nor can it be anyone's aim to forcefully divest any nation — howe­
ver small its population and size —of its national character, and since the 
movement started on the pretext of their nation's oppression by t he leaders 
of the Illyrian party against the Magyar language after the Diet raised 
it to the status of diplomatic language is unfounded, replacing as it does 
in administration and legislation not the Illyrian, but the dead Roman 
language, foreign to the Illyrians as well, and since, in addition to all this, 
it is not in Hungary's, but in Croatia's interest to be the complement 
of the former in matters of administration and legislation, the repre­
sentatives of this county arc convinced—since no one. neither individual 
nor nation can be compelled against his conviction to do even what is good, 
and in order that this friction with the Illyrian party might come to an 
end once and for all — that it will be more conducive to the peaceful develop­
ment of Hungary and the Hungarian nation if Croatia is separated from Hun­
gary in respect of administration and legislation, though not from the 
Hungarian Holy Crown." The motion having been adopted, "they instruc­
ted their delegates to the Diet to propose this separation/" and decided 
to send a circular calling on all the country's municipalities to support 
their initiative". The account of the motion ends on a note of caution: 
"Hut first, so that the subject might be completely exhausted as befits 
its importance, they instructed the delegates in charge of matters per- 
tainhig to the Diet to examine all the circumstances surrounding the 
separation already accepted in principle, and to present their findings and 
proposals to the general assembly at its next meeting"."
Kossuth reported on the matter in the Rasfí /ib'/up (Pest Journal) 
with some of the first reactions already in mind, and with comments that
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invited a rethinking of the matter. He related that the motion had been 
accepted "without an opinion to the contrary, unanimously", but presented 
the matter as if the thought of seccession had been but proposed for 
consideration, as something "perhaps more to the point" than the existing 
situation. Then, declaring that he by no means wanted to pronounce on the 
matter before the appointed committee had worked out the details of 
seccession, he assured the Croats that if they stood firm against the aggres­
sions of Illyrianism, they could rest assured that "the Magyar nation would 
clasp with constant fraternal love the fraternal hand of its loyal Croatian 
brothers, holding them inseparably to itself, and thereby to liberty, civili­
zation, and constitutionalism". On the other hand, of the Illyrian move­
ment came to dominate in Croatia, the nations lawmakers would need to find 
the means of protecting the Hungarians'interests J- In proposing secession , 
therefore Kossuth probably had a twofold purpose: the one, to try to arrest 
the Illyrian movement in its aggressive bid to take over Croatia's local 
government; the other, to put a radical end to the Croatian-Magyar anta­
gonism and thus both forestall Vienna's attempts to divide and conquer, 
and prevent what the reformers saw as a Czarist-oriented panslavism from 
becoming a leading force in Hungary. Also, he obviously thought that if 
the Magyar national movement were rid of its most powerful rival — at the 
price of Croatia's secession, if need be—it would have a better chance of 
acquiring the leading role in a Hungary whose territorial integrity was 
otherwise to be restored to what it had been before 1326, before the Turkish 
conquest, and Habsburg ruleM
Soon it became apparent that Kossuth's motion of secession would 
receive the support he was expecting not even from the leading reformers. 
Even the bitter letter of support sent by Miklós Wesselényi—Kossuth's 
model and patron, whose growing blindness and illness pushed him ever 
farther to the back of the political stage —was not without reservation: 
"Pest (County's) motion on Croatia is very important. For my own part, 
I've long seen the sad necessity and inevitability of a step of this sort; but 
I  was surprised by its being moved and decided on by a municipality so 
soon. I fear we are starting our vigil too late;* ' and that we are locking the 
barn door when it is already e m p ty ."'s We know from the reports secret 
agents sent to Vienna that Kossuth's motion did win the support of one 
leading reformer. József Eötvös (minister of religious and cultural affairs 
in both 1848 and 1867),"' but most of his fellow reformers were far from 
approving of it. "Even my best friends were taken aback at the idea", 
recalled Kossuth at the Sept. 2, 1848 sitting of the House of Representa­
tives And in 1830, when Kossuth, interned in Turkey, replied to Count 
László Teleki—formerly the Hungarian Revolutionary Government's 
Ambassador to Paris who had urged roconcilitation with the country's other 
national groups —he reminded him that neither he, nor Deák, nor Count 
Lajos Batthyány (the head of the first Hungarian Government in 1848) 
had supported his earlier motion for "the independence of Croatia".^ But it 
was a question of more than just lack of support; in fact, Kossuth and his 
motion came in for some strong criticism.
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in the heat of the battles of 1848, not much before -lelacic's attack 
on Die country, Kossuth mentioned in a tetter with no tittle bitterness that 
after tus motion for Croatia's secession at the Pest County assembly had 
been accepted, "the whole country cried me down for it, and yet how much 
wiser it would have been to see it through".'" But white tin- reformers were 
reserved, the conservative press attacked the motion in tones calculated to 
ftame the spirit of nationalism, calling it destructive both of Magyar 
interests in Croatia, and of the Croatian feudal constitution.-" Count 
István Széchenyi, the great pioneer of reform, who, by then, was moving 
politically ever farther from the reforming opposition and closer to coope­
ration with the government, saw Kossuth's motion as an excellent oppor­
tunity to renew his attacks on what he saw as 1ns excessive radicalism. He 
wrote a second book criticizing Kossuth, !7urn/ (Hopper) which, for various, 
reasons, he did not publish: the burdenofthebook,however,herepeatedin 
a number of polit ical forums. He spoke of "charlatans" in commenting on 
Kossuth's motion, charlatans, "who for every pain on the body politic, 
. . .recommended amputation without further ado, even ifit meant amputa­
ting an entire country, as, for j'nstance, Croatia; and if they but had as much 
power as they hav e well-wishers!"* they would carry it out. too".-- At the 
beginning of 1843, when Széchenyi was putting the blame for the growing 
violence of the confrontation between the country's national movements on 
the reformers, and especially Wesselényi and Kossuth, he dubbed the 
latter's initiative "souverainment. (nr rather pitoyablement) ridicule". 
He called it an "Anglo-Magyar, or rather an Irish-Magyar motion", refer­
ring to Daniel O'Connell's"^ "Repeal of the Union" of 1830; and to empha­
size its "destructive" nature the more, he added: "Except there, it's not 
the mother country that wants the Repeal, though the "branch-country" is, 
at times, inconvenient enough to her, but the "branch-country" yearns for 
the Repeal".-' But more influential, perhaps, in the stand finally taken by 
Pest County's leading politicians than Széehenyi's repeated public jibes-" 
and the clandestine schcmings of the conservatives-" were the facts that 
the leading reformers refused to side with the motion, and that it seems to 
have caused consternation among the pro-Hungarian faction in Croatia,^ 
and finally, the circumstance that Vienna, determined to consolidate the 
position of the conservatives in Croatia, too, turned —at least for the 
time —against the Illyrian movement.-^
It was a year after passing Kossuth's motion that the Pest county 
general assembly adopted a stand that was quite to the contrary. The 
occasion was the much-debated language issue just then preoccupying 
the newly assembled Diet. The attempt to make Hungarian the official 
language was supported not only by Széchenyi and Eötvös, who were 
present, and Kossuth and Deák. who were not, as well as a great many 
liberals, but also by most of the Magyar Conservatives, all of which made 
( roatian-Magyar relations more strained than before. The two opposition 
delegates sent by Pest county, Count Cedeon Ráday and Móric Szenkirályi, 
reporting to the county assembly on the complexities of the political 
struggle going on. had this to say in connection with the language issue:
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"As Hungary is one, so the government-" of Hungary and its annexed parts 
is also one, and more precisely, Hungarian. If, therefore, fairness requires 
that the Croatian nation remain untouched in respect of its domestic affairs, 
strict justice demands that Croatia as a joint country use the national 
language of the mother country and its government^" in its dealings with 
the government and the mother country; the contrary would he de/nc/o to 
recognize that the government of Croatia is not one with the Hungarian 
government, something that cannot he recognized." The county assembly 
approved this report of its delegates to the Diet, a report which emphasized 
Croatia's traditional dependence on Hungary as something to he sustained. 
With this, the assembly was, in fact, nullifying its acceptance of Kossuth's 
motion of secessions!. So ended this episode in the history of the Croatian- 
Magyar conflicts of the 1840s. We might find it paradoxical that Kos­
suth, who had proposed secession in 1842, and then tried, in 1845, to 
promote the alliance of the two national movements*^ (something the 
Palatine had supposed he might do for years) ended up finding 
it necessary, as a reformer, to turn against the Illyrian movement, which 
was ever more prone to use the conservatives' help and court influence to 
try to realize its goals. We might find it paradoxical, hut it was logical 
enough; in any case, it was tragic.
Yet, though both sides were growing increasingly suspicious and more 
and more touchy, there were efforts being made to find a peaceful solution. 
On the very eve of the revolution, on January 28, 1848, Kossuth, speaking 
at the Diet as the leader of the reforming opposition, made this declaration 
of principle: "As for the unfortunate Croatian-Illyrian issue, I, for my part, 
have always and will always be of the mind that whatever steps need to be 
taken in this matter should always be led by the desire not so much to 
rub salt into old wounds to take revenge, but rather to make up for these 
in the future."3" On March, 28, 1848, as a member of the first Hungarian 
cabinet responsible to the parliament, he expressed his belief that, the 
Hungarian revolution having done away with feudalism, "the guarantee of 
Croatia's liberty is closely tied to Hungary's". "When liberty is shared, it 
often appeases the enmity of one nation for the other", he went on, more by 
way of encouragement to the fact than with faith in its being so in this 
case; yet he felt" it was a grave duty incumbent on the Magyar nation . . . 
to reassure the people of Croatia that Hungary respects their nationhood". 
To this end, he found it necessary to issue a proclamation which —in the 
words of liis draft — was meant to reassure the "nations united under the 
Hungarian Crown" that the government would see that the measures passed 
to rid them of feudalism and absolutism take effect, and that "rights and 
duties would be shared equally"; Hungary and Croatia were to be tied 
"by their common liberty, common parliament, common government and 
common king", with Hungarian being the official language of their dea­
lings with one another, but with Croatian being the language and nationa­
lity that was to dominate within Croatia "as the inalienable right of the 
Croatian citizens".
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We have not, and cannot try here to give as mucii as a cursory over­
view of tiie developments in Croatian-Magyar relations at this time. We 
must be content to recall that the iaws reshaping Hungary's constitutional 
system the spring of 1848 brought iittie direct change in the constitutional 
ties binding Croatia and Hungary. The Sabor in Zagreb was given a propor­
tionately greater collective representation in the Hungarian parliament 
(which had been moved from Pozsony to Pest); and the Sabor —or rather, 
the Ban —was, temporarily, to oversee the elections to be held in the 
Military Border which the Hungarian politicians wanted to see directly 
represented in parliam ents Furthermore, the paragraph of the bill dealing 
with the counties, which declared Hungarian to be the official language of 
the county assemblies, was declared not to apply to the "annexed parts", 
thus not to Croatia either.3" All this indicates that Hungary's political 
leaders wanted to keep Croatia's constitutional ties to Hungary much as 
it had been, though they were willing enough to see it updated. The moder­
nization, they hoped, would go some way toward relaxing the tension that 
had built up. (We must note, however, that the decision to give the Military 
Border direct representation in parliament in fact had just the opposite 
effect.)
For all that, the disposition to accomodate and modernize was evident 
enough to cause consernation among those who saw conflict among its 
rival forces as the best guarantee of the system's —and the Empire's — 
integrity. Count Kolowrat, for instance, urged the Emperor in his letter 
of March 20, 1848, to name Baron Jelacic Ban of Croatia whithout further 
delay because he feared that Count Lajos Batthyány, the proposed Prime 
Minister of Hungary, and Kossuth "locken die kroatisch-slavonischen 
Lander durch Zusagcn der Anerkennung Hirer Munizipalrechte, Sprache 
etc. an sich".37 Jelacic's nomination took place with the help of those 
pro-Vienna Hungarian conservatives who felt that as Ban of Croatia, he 
would exploit "their military organization and hurt national pride in the 
service of the crown", and, by implication, use it to frustrate the presumed 
aims of the Hungarian reformers.33
And that, indeed, is how it turned out to be. The new Hungarian 
government, which hoped —rather naively —to get the newly convened 
Parliament to approve the provisional law that had been framed in the 
hopes of reconciling the two sides came up against the intransigence of 
Jelacic, whose amassed army gave his words no small weight. Jelacic proved 
unwilling as much as to take part in the direct negotiations proposed by 
the Hungarian government not long after its taking office, heedless of the 
declaration of the Council of Ministers that "it would do everything that the 
law, justice, and fairness required to strengthen the faith Hungary and 
Croatia mutually had in one another".3"
The day after the Council of Ministers called on the Ban of Croatia to 
negotiate, on April 20. 1848, Miklós Wesselényi sent a letter to Primo 
Minister Batthyány. Wesselényi, as we have alreadynoted, had been bitterly 
approving in 1842 of Kossuth's motion at the Pest County assembly; his 
book of 1843/° however, discussed secession as undesirable, and disadvan-
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tageous to the Croatians, too. Now, Wesselényi expressed his fear that the 
court was planning to reverse the gains that had been made, with Jelacic 
being the instrument that was to see the matter through. And he went on: 
"In view of all this, I think that we must avoid everything that might serve 
the Ban and his Croats as an excuse to openly declare their secession and 
carry it through. We cannot keep Croatia for our own; let's give up all efforts 
to do so, which can bring no benefit, but can do harm. Let's make an agree­
ment with the Croats, one that, recognizes them, and guarantees their 
independence, but guarantees also our trade and gives us joint ownership 
of a piece of coastline." Wesselényi made it quite clear that he wanted the 
two countries to separate constitutionally with the approval of parliament, 
but he felt it most urgent that the Hungarian government let the Croats 
know as soon as possible that it was willing to take such a step: "If we give 
them hope of its coming to pass, I think that they will rest assured until 
the parliament can deal with the matter." At the same time. Wesselényi 
urged the government to be prepared for an armed defence; and this he 
repeated publicly, too, at a meeting of the Pest radicals.** Wesselényid 
proposal was. in fact, the renewal and development of Kossuth's motion of 
1842, but there is no indication that any of the Hungarian ministers turned 
against the tide of a public opinion exasperated by the threats coming from 
Zagreb, and acted on Wesselényid farsighted words at that time.
At the same time, we know that right up to Jelacicd armed attack 
on the country, the Hungarian government repeatedly expressed its readi­
ness to reach a negotiated settlement, and in a variety of ways at that. 
I t  did so in spite of the fact that Jelacic broke off all relations with the 
Hungarian government, defying the orders even of the viceroy, the Palatine 
Stephen, and, assuming absolute power, declared martial law in Croatia, 
ordered conscription, convened the Sabor without the ruler's consent, and 
was (on the Hungarian government's initiative) suspended from his office 
of Ban by the ruler on June 10,1848.*- Still theBatthyány government was 
willing to negotiate with him, for it wanted peace, and de /ac/o power 
remaned in Jelacicd hands, since the court took no steps to actually divest 
him of power; on the contrary, there was every indication that Jelacicd loss 
of favour (and ho continued to enjoy the Minister of War Count Latour's 
patronage) was but temporary.
Jelacic himself could have no doubt that the Hungarian government 
wanted a peaceful solution. On June 29 he wrote to the Archduke John, 
who had taken on the task of mediating, that he knew quite well that 
there was no threat of a Hungarian attack on Croatia.*^ In this he was not 
mistaken. I t is only fair to emphasize that the entire Batthyány government 
was for a settlement through negotiation, was even for making concessions. 
This is quite clear from the memorandum -  probably drafted by Kossuth — 
that the government sent the Palatine in which, outlining the basis of ist 
Croatian policy, it declared: " ..  .We shall remain ready to defend ourselves 
against the Croats, until we are either attacked, or are compelled to give 
up the hope of a peaceful settlement". The memorandum admitted that 
"the Croats have a number of grievances still awaiting redress from times
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past"; but these it declared to be "the unfortunate legacy of (the earlier) 
system of government", and added that the attempts of t he government 
which took office in April of 1848 to redress them were frustrated by .1 elacic 
who put an end to "every contact with physical violence . The government 
also declared its readiness to support the demands put forward by the 
Croatian Sabor in 1845. This is of special interest from our point of view 
because the demands made'' — the most important among them that 
Croatia get its own organ of central government independent of the Consi­
lium regium locumtenentialo Hungaricum —were steps if not toward 
secession, at least toward a much greater independence. However, the me­
morandum, while emphasizing the Hungarian government's willingness to 
negotiate, left no doubt that the government would not "stand hv and 
watch. . . the violent secession of the annexed parts". The most important 
parts of the memorandum were quoted practically verbatim bv Kossuth in 
his famous address of.July 11; on-July 20 he read the complete memoran­
dum to the House of Representatives, and had it published by the press. '-' 
tin July 22, 1848, László Teleki — who, as we know from Kossuth's 
later reproach, had opposed his proposal of Croatia's secession in 1842 -  had 
this to say in the House of Representatives in reply to an interruption of 
his speech urging support for italian independence: "If Croatia sees its 
interest as a nation in seceding from Hungary, I shall respect its wishes". But 
he added immediately that he considered Jelacie to be "a supporter of reac­
tion", one whose ambitions did not express the wiilof'theCroatian people".
When Batthyány met Jelacie in Vienna the last week of Jnly for a se­
ries of talks he arrived fully prepared to make a great many concessions to 
Croatian national aspirations, and had his cabinet's full support in this. 
Széchenyi —terriiied oi the eruption of "the forces of plunder and anarchy" 
— veritably begged Batthyány to secure peace;*" and Kossuth —having 
done everything to prepare Hungary to ward off the likely attack-hoped 
for a solution to the Croatian issue as a means of forestalling the chances of 
Habsburg reaction. It is possible that Kossuth had already got word of the 
element in the first round of talks that had taken Batthyány so much by 
surprise-namely, the fact that Jelacie had conic to discuss not so mucit 
matters relating to Croatian national interests as the possibility of curtailing 
the jurisdiction of the Hungarian government in the name of the unity of 
the Empire*^ —when he made some comments in his paper of special 
interest from the point of view of our subject. In an article dated July 29 
which appeared the following day, he had this to say: "We shall negotiate, 
if need be, with hell itself: we shall negotiate, if negotiate we must, on purely 
Croatian grounds, perhaps even with Jelacie; but we shall never negotiate 
with reactionaries who would curb Hungary's independence". .Just what 
those "purely Croatian grounds" might have been we get an idea of from a 
later passage in the article where, speaking of the chances of changes in the 
structure ofthe Habsburg Empire, he notes that, with appropriate changes, 
"we might, consider the idea of forming not a union with the Croats, but a 
confederation".*" This might not prove much, but it does show that at 
the time of Batthyány and Jelacic's talks, an extraordinarily influential
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member of the Hungarian government could see Croatia's separation as a 
possible wav of settling the Croatian issue.
Batthyány returned from Vienna allegedly hopeful that they could 
come to an agreement with Jelaciá;^ and not even the rather contradictory 
news of the growing anti-Magyar sentiment and of the amassed troops in 
Croatia could quite persuade him of the contrary. It would be unjust on 
this account to accuse Hungary's leading politicians of naivete; after all. 
though the statement Jetacic issued in Zagreb on August 8 on the Viennese 
talks used language was threatening enough and called the demands he had 
put to Batthyány his "last " peace proposal, none of his demands concerning 
Croatian-Magyar relations were impossible, nor was there any talk of 
secession. In fact, in speaking of the details yet to be worked out, he men­
tioned the Hungarian parliament as "common".si We know, furthermore, 
that the M in is te r  of War Count Latour tried to persuade the AHnMferru/ on 
Aug. 26, 1818 to vote financial support for Jelacié's troops with the consi­
deration that it was the only way of keeping the Ban from attacking too 
soon, or — what is even more interesting for us — from "throwing himself 
into the Magyars' arms"."'- In this ambivalent situation, and short of 
funds as it was, the Hungarian government could make but very haphazard 
[separations for defence, all the while repeating its readiness to negotiate."" 
The Council of Ministers decided on Aug. 25 "that a bill be presented in 
parliament, one regulating Croatia's and Hungary's relations in a way that 
might perhaps be able to soothe discontent there". The ministers of justice 
and of internal affairs were entrusted with working out the details."*
Barely two days later, on Aug 27, the relatively detailed proposal 
(based in no small measure on earlier drafts) was ready for discussion. The 
council of ministers passed the bill presented by the Minister of Justice. 
Ferenc Deák, which left defence, foreign affairs, finance and trade in the 
hands of the Hungarian government, with provisions, however, for the 
participation of the respective Croatian under secretaries, and a somewhat 
ill-defined stipulation that the Ban, too, had the right to a say in these 
matters. All other matters of government were to be in the hands of the 
minister of Croatian affairs, who was to reside in Pest or Zagreb, as the 
f roatians wished. I lie laws were to be enacted either by the parliament 
in Pest, where the Croatians were also represented, with the Sabor in 
Zagreb having power but to pass statutes: or by both the parliament and 
the Sabor, with areas of legislative competence divided up analogously 
to the executive. The proposal suggested that Croatian be recognized as 
the official language of Croatia, that a university be set up in Zagreb, and 
that Hungary and Croatia communicate with one another each in its 
own language, enclosing a translation of the text. There was a detailed 
passage on how the population of the Military Border was to enjoy the 
reforms"" which had. for the most [tart, been promised by the Hungarian 
government some time earlier.""
The Council of Ministers, as we know, went beyond declaring its 
preparedness to negotiate on the terms summarized above, and added that 
if all this should fail to lead to a settlement, it was willing to agree to
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secession, and to accept a pureiy federal tie, keeping possession of Fiume, 
Hungary's access to theses, with guarantees of free access and free trade".
We have no information as to who it was of the members of the 
government sitting in Pest that initiated tins alternative proposal. It could 
have been anyone except the Minister of War, Lázár Mészáros, who was 
not in Pest at that time. It was unlikely to have been Deák or Szemere, for 
we find no trace of the idea in the written proposal that they did submit. 
It is just as unlikely that (iábor Klauzál, who dealt mostly with questions 
of economic policy , should have initiated it. Either József Eötvös or István 
Széchenyi, committed as they were to keeping the peace, might have done 
so, though the latter would scarcely have failed to mention it in his diarv 
if he had. There is a good chance that it was Batthyány who revived 
Wessclcnvi'sss spring proposal now that the time was ripe for action. The 
text, in any case, was totally in keeping with what Wesselényi had sugges­
ted, including the proviso concerning access to Fiume, which was 
something that earlier laws had also stipulated as a prerequisite."" On thc 
basis of some references Kossuth made in his above quoted article at the end 
of Julv. we can also conjecture that he. too, urged the matter once again; 
the conjecture will seem all the more well-grounded if we recall that Kossuth 
committed as he was to multilateral trade, was the prime exponent of 
using Fiume as a base for expanding Hungary's future markets.""
But whoever initiated that noteworthy proposal of Aug. 27, 1848, we 
can have no doubt that Kossuth sincerely hoped that it would be well- 
received, although he could have had few illusions as to its chances of 
being so."' His letter of Aug. 20 to his friend László Csányi, who was orga­
nizing the defences along the Croatian border,*^ ends on the following note: 
"The Diet will vote to give Croatia all possible concessions in the next few 
days, even secession, if they want it. But our liberty w e won't surrender.""" 
Two days later, he sent Csányi a copy of Deák's bill which the council of 
ministers had approved, commenting: "In a few days it will be submitted 
to the House along with the alternative that if the Croats don't like it .. . 
they can secede, but Fiume is ours, that we 11 give nobody . It was here 
that he noted what a pity it was that the proposal he'd made in 1842 had 
been poorly received. And he also added something to Deák's bill that 
deserves our attention. He declared himself ready to cede Slavonia'" 
(which the Croatian nationalists wanted to unify with Croatia), with the 
exception of two, strategically important points: "Slavonia is the problem 
- b u t  rather than endanger Hungary, we'll let that go, too, in any case 
keeping Pétervárad (Pctrovaradin) and Eszék (Osijek)". He wrote all this 
to Csányi, who already had very wide discretionary powers, adding that 
"if he thought it a wise and good idea, he should get into contact w ith the 
Croats, and tell them that if they really are acting in the spirit of nationa­
lism and not of reaction, if they don't want to be so foolish as to be the hand 
that reaction has take the chestnut out of the fire for it. then let them tell 
us w hat they want. We'll give Croatia everything, even secession; let them go, 
but let's be good friends . . .if they want to secede, they should go ahead, 
let them be free and happy, but let them not bring blood and misfortune
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onthetwo countries for a foreign reactionary power.""" The roya) edict of 
Aug 31, 1848 (the day of Jelacic's first military action, the occupation of 
Fiume) left no doubt that the Habsburgs, encouraged by their victory in 
Italy, were determined to curtai) the self-government Hungary had won with 
the royally sanctioned laws of the spring of 1848; Batthyány and Deák had to 
go to Vienna to negotiate. In their absence, but obviously with their consent, 
Kossuth presented the bill Deák had framed (and the Council of Ministers 
passed) for the House to consider without further delay. It was a closed 
session, and we can but suppose that the minister council's stand on the 
issue of Croatia's possible secession was also raised; we know that Kossuth 
spoke of the matter on two separate occasions at the time of presenting 
the bill. Referring in turn to the stand Pest, county had taken in 1842 at 
his instigation, and then to László Telcki's proposal to the House on July 
22, 1848, he urged that Croatia's secession be agreed to. should the provi­
sions of the bill prove unacceptable to the Croats."" On 8ept. 4, at Kossuth's 
suggestion, the House appointed 12 of its prominent members to draft a 
resolution on the Croatian issue. The resolution empowered László Csányi 
to convoke an independent "parliament" of the Croatian and Slavonian 
representatives, in order to be able to meet all the demands aiming "at the 
full guarantee of the nationhood, nation-wide rights and liberties of the 
Croatian and Slavonian people". The House had no time to pass the 
resolution: Jelacic, whom the ruler had officially reinstated as Ban of 
Croatia on September 4, launched his offensive. On the morrow of Jelacic 
crossing into Hungary, however, on Sept. 12, the government had the text 
of the resolution printed up on a placard."? I t is hardly likely that a reso­
lution passed by the House would have availed Csányi more in his attempt 
to secure peace. Csányi knew of all the latest concessions the government 
was prepared to make to Croatia; his letter of Sept. 5 to Kossuth, however, 
reports that Jelacic was adamant in his refusal to negotiate, a circumstance 
Csányi attributed to the fact that Croatia's absolute leader wanted war, 
not peace. On Sept. 8, Csányi sent his own foster son and another officer 
to Zagreb, all in vain."" Jelacic wanted to win a victory over the Hungarian 
government, not concessions from it.
The oft-repeated Magyar prophecy of the summer of 1848, that the 
Croats would become the tools of reaction, had been fulfilled. The defeat 
the Hungarian National Guard suffered a year later at the hands of the 
combined forces of the Austrian Emperor and the Russian Czar did not 
bring victory to the Croatian national movement. The Hungarians were 
defeated, the Croats were double-crossed by the victors, and for both there 
followed years of oppression, whence there could spring the hope that both 
had learned their lesson, and would seek allies not against, but in one 
another. It was this hope that informed from 1849 to 1867 the policy of 
that most consistent Hungarian opponent of compromise with the Habs­
burgs. the exiled Kossuth, a policy based on the unreserved recognition 
of Croatia-Slavonia's light to self-government. On this, much has alreadv 
been written."" and to say any more here would take us well beyond the 
scope of the present paper.
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u Of,. H . 5. A/. 1949. au g  23-i m in isz tertanácsi jegyzőkönyv egykorú  m áso la ta  (A con tem ­
poraneous copy of th e  m inu tes o f  th e  Aug. 23, 1S4S s it tin g  o f  th e  Council o f M inisters) 
KÖM. X )]. pp. 7 0 9 - s<)6. — Adée/mayt. /.-.-I'-ón p. )3 ]3 .
f)L . 11. 3. D eák Ferenc igazságügy!n iu iszter egykorú  fogalm azványa az 19-ls. aug. 27-i 
m in isz tertan ács ira ta i közö tt (.¡ustice M inister Ferenc D eck 's  con tem poraneous m em o­
ran d u m , am ong th e  Aug. 27. 1949 pap ers  o f  t he Council o f M inisters). A'drotyt, . Í . . 11. pp. 
6 2 6 -6 2 9 .
-'K Sec Adat,ad, t ; A m ag y ar ko rm án y zat reform törekvései tt b a tá rtu v id ék en  194S/49-b)'t) 
(T)te H ungarian  governm en ts a tte m p ts  a t  reform  on t he Műit a ry  B o rder 1949 49), itt
press.
At OB. 11. 3. Szem ete H crta ian  belügym iniszter egy k o rú  feljegyzése az  1949. augusz tus 27-i 
m in isz tertanács ira ta i k ö zö tt. (M inister o f  th e  In te rio r  B e rta lan  Szem cre's con tem pora­
neous notes;, am ong th e  Aug. 27. ] 949 pap ers  o f  th e  Council o f  M inisters) — KÖM. X ) l .p .  
905. — A úr"/'//, .Í .  11. pp. 629 — 629.
f t  isw o r th n o tin g  tltat W esselényi's a rtic le  o f-lttlv 2 4 , "M iként eszközölhető becsü le tünk­
kel m egegyezhető b éke" (H ow  w e m ight win peace w ith  honour) says n o th in g  o f  sep ara ­
tion , hut ra th e r  urges a rm am en t a n d  th e  w inning o f  co u rt su p p o rt, A-Msat/i B ir/a/z/a  
(K o ssu th 's  Xcws). Ju ly  26, 1949.
o f. ]907. Law  1 \'.. 1936. L aw s X IX , X X \  . — I f. C.wta/<ry. .4. 1\ . pp. 2)6  -  226. 
ro c f .  té  ryf /'/. . 4 . A fium ei v a sú t v i tá ja  az utolsét rendi országgyűlésen. (The Fittnte tailw ay 
d eb ate  a t th e  test feudal D ie t j in ,Századok, 1979.— it is possible th a t  K ossu th , n o t wish­
ing ! must I f  to  repeat a  suggestion  th a t  m ost leading reform ers had refused to  su p p o rt, 
had  instiga ted  W esselényid  proposa] o f April 1949. H ow ever, we have abso lu te ly  no evi­
dence to  su p p o rt t in's hypothesis.
'U W e th in k  it im p o rtan t to  m ake tin s  p o in t because Is tv á n  Deák, in his discussion o f  th e  
Council o f M inister's decision on th e  secession issue (he c red its  D eák wit)) fo rm ula ting  
th e  m otion), adds th is  rem ark : „K o ssu th  su p p o rted  th e  b iti a t th e  cab inet m eeting  
w h e th er sincerely o r on)y to  prove th a t  concessions wotdd leat) now here, is not know n " 
Dt'di:, 7.. T h e  Lawftt) R evolution . Louis K o ssu th  and  th e  H ungarians, 1949 - I St'. I. XI - w 
York, )979. p. 137.
** L ászló Csánvi () 796 — 1949) was onn o f  th e  leaders o f  th e  reform ing  opposition , attd was one 
o f  th e  people who w orked m ost closely w ith  K ossu th  in 1 9 ) 9 -  49. He was M inister ut 
T ran sp o rt Irotn May o f  1949. At Öct. )" , 1949 ho was cou it-m artiaH ed  and executed. 
KÖM . X H . pp. 9 2 6 -9 2 7 .
f  T he p red o m in an tly  S o u th  —Slav in h ab ited  a rea  bounded tty C roatia , th e  D rava, th e  
D anube a n d  th e  Száva; even before 1949, its  po p u latio n  had sen t rep resen ta tives no t to  
th e  Sabor in Z agreb, bu t to  th e  H un g arian  D iet,
*ö KÖM . X I 1. pp. .933 -  933. Barin, K ossu th  és Csányi, (K ossu th  an d  Csányi) Századok, 
1932. pp . 6 2 2 -6 2 3 .
<=" KÖM. X !L  pp . 9 7 0 -9 7 3 .
Az 1949/49 t'-vi népképvisele ti országgyűlés (The popu lar rep resen ta tiv e  p arliam en t o f  
1949 — 49), (ed. by  B " 'r , C stdtaadta. .4. and  Bt/tdat, 7.. j  Up- 1934, pp. 61. 214 216,
693 — 694. Cf. A'cpe/cw (The po p u lar elem ent), 194,9, S ep tem ber 13.
"A B ort", -7- pp- 623 — 623.
Of. Aatw-s, At. pp . 369 -  437. — Rza/tad, (B/. 7977. pp. 170 -  195. -A dattad . H ungáriát) 
Political T rends betw een tile  R evolu tion  and  th e  Com prom ise (194!) -  1967). (T ransla ted  
by H attaat, %'.) Bp. 1977. pp. 57 — 62. 1 1 2 -1 1 3 , 123 131, 162 104.
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